New NSA Docs Contradict 9-11 Claims

http://beforeitsnews.com/story/2298/274/New_NSA_docs_contradict_9_11_claims.html

Sat Jun 23 2012  Salon

“I don’t think the Bush administration would want to see these released,” an expert tells Salon

Over 120 CIA documents concerning 9/11, Osama bin Laden and counterterrorism were published today for the first time, having been newly declassified and released to the National Security Archive. The documents were released after the NSA pored through the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission and sent Freedom of Information Act requests.The material contains much new information about the hunt before and after 9/11 for bin Laden, the development of the drone campaign in AfPak, and al-Qaida’s relationship with America’s ally, Pakistan. Perhaps most damning are the documents showing that the CIA had bin Laden in its cross hairs a full year before 9/11 — but didn’t get the funding from the Bush administration White House to take him out or even continue monitoring him. The CIA materials directly contradict the many claims of Bush officials that it was aggressively pursuing al-Qaida prior to 9/11, and that nobody could have predicted the attacks. “I don’t think the Bush administration would want to see these released, because they paint a picture of the CIA knowing something would happen before 9/11, but they didn’t get the institutional support they needed,” says Barbara Elias-Sanborn, the NSA fellow who edited the materials.
Let’s start there. In 2000 and 2001, the CIA began using Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Afghanistan. “The idea of using UAVs originated in April 2000 as a result of a request from the NSC’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the CIA and the Department of Defense to come up with new ideas to go after the terrorists in Afghanistan,” a 2004 document https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/368992/2004-03-19-dci-report-the-rise-of-ubl-and-al.pdf

summarizes. The Pentagon approved the plan for surveillance purposes.

And yet, simultaneously, the CIA declared that budget concerns were forcing it to move its Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit from an “offensive” to a “defensive” posture. For the CIA, that meant trying to get Afghan tribal leaders and the Northern Alliance to kill or capture bin Laden, Elias-Sanborn says. “It was forced to be less of a kinetic operation,” she says. “It had to be only for surveillance, which was not what they considered an offensive posture.”

“Budget concerns … CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level,” an April 2000 document reads. “Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections.” In addition, the Air Force told the CIA that if it lost a drone, the CIA would have to pay for it, which made the agency more reluctant to use the technology.

Still, the drone program began in September 2000. One drone swiftly twice observed an individual “most likely to have been Bin Laden.” But since the CIA only had permission to use the drones for intelligence gathering, it had no way to act on its findings. The agency submitted a proposal to the National Security Council staff in December 2000 that would have significantly expanded the program. “It was too late for the departing Clinton Administration to take action on this strategic request,” however. It wasn’t too late for the Bush administration, though. It just never did.

Former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has taken credit for the drone program that the Bush administration ignored. “Things like working to get an armed Predator that actually turned out to be extraordinarily important, working to get a strategy that would allow us to get better cooperation from Pakistan and from the Central Asians,” she said in 2006. “We were not left a comprehensive strategy to fight al-Qaida.” Rice claimed that the Bush administration continued the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism policies, a claim the documents disprove. “If the administration wanted to get it done, I’m sure they could have gotten it done,” says Elias-Sanborn.

Many of the documents publicize for the first time what was first made clear in the 9/11 Commission: The White House received a truly remarkable amount of warnings that al-Qaida was trying to attack the United States. From June to September 2001, a full seven CIA Senior Intelligence Briefs detailed that attacks were imminent, an incredible amount of information from one intelligence agency. One from June called “Bin-Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats” writes that “[redacted] expects Usama Bin Laden to launch multiple attacks over the coming days.” The famous August brief called “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike the US” is included. “Al-Qai’da members, including some US citizens, have resided in or travelled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure here,” it says. During the entire month of August, President Bush was on vacation at his ranch in Texas — which tied with one of Richard Nixon’s as the longest vacation ever taken by a president. CIA Director George Tenet has said he didn’t speak to Bush once that month, describing the president as being “on leave.” Bush did not hold a Principals’ meeting on terrorism until September 4, 2001, havingdowngraded the meetings to a deputies’ meeting, which then-counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke has repeatedly said slowed down anti-Bin Laden efforts “enormously, by months.”

For all the information the documents reveal, one huge matter is conspicuously absent: torture. There are nearly 50 CIA documents relating to such matters as the interrogation of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the intelligence gleaned from him, and yet “none of them were declassified at all,” notes Elias-Sanborn. “Certainly, the CIA has a stake in revealing what they did,” and they clearly do not want to reveal their complicity in war crimes.

One last thing is worth mentioning from the documents published today:  Anyone with any doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dangerous to the United States is contradicting U.S. intelligence. “Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests,” the CIA wrote in February 2001. It is not the only piece of information revealed by the new documents that will be deeply uncomfortable for the Bush administration and hawks across the country.

Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

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http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB381/

Excerpt from “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 20, 1999.

The Central Intelligence Agency’s 9/11 File Top Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden Declassified National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 381 Posted – June 19, 2012 Edited by Barbara Elias-Sanborn with Thanks to Archive Senior Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson For more information contact: Barbara Elias-Sanborn – 202/994-7000 belias@gwu.edu Washington, D.C., June 19, 2012 – The National Security Archive today is posting over 100 recently released CIA documents relating to September 11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations.  The newly-declassified records, which the Archive obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, are referred to in footnotes to the 9/11 Commission Report and present an unprecedented public resource for information about September 11. The collection includes rarely released CIA emails, raw intelligence cables, analytical summaries, high-level briefing materials, and comprehensive counterterrorism reports that are usually withheld from the public because of their sensitivity.  Today’s posting covers a variety of topics of major public interest, including background to al-Qaeda’s planning for the attacks; the origins of the Predator program now in heavy use over Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; al-Qaeda’s relationship with Pakistan; CIA attempts to warn about the impending threat; and the impact of budget constraints on the U.S. government’s hunt for bin Laden. Today’s posting is the result of a series of FOIA requests by National Security Archive staff based on a painstaking review of references in the 9/11 Commission Report. DOCUMENT HIGHLIGHTS The documents released by CIA detail the meticulousness of al-Qaeda’s plot against the United States and CIA attempts to counter the rising terrorist threat. A previously undisclosed raw intelligence report that became the basis for the December 4, 1998, President’s Daily Brief notes that five years before the actual attack, al-Qaeda operatives had successfully evaded security at a New York airport in a test-run for bin Laden’s plan to hijack a U.S. airplane. [1998-12-03]. CIA analytical reports also provide interesting insights into al-Qaeda’s evolving political strategies. “In our view, the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value. For instance, the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family.” [2003-06-01] Reports on early attempts to apprehend bin Laden detail the beginning of the U.S. Predator drone program in Afghanistan and Pakistan. “First Predator mission over Afghanistan [excised] September 7, 2000.” [1] “Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however we had no way at the time to react to this information.” [2004-03-19] American UAVs did not have sufficient weapons capabilities at the time the CIA likely spotted bin Laden in 2000 to fire on the suspect using the UAV. Al-Qaeda’s ties to Pakistan before September 11 are also noted in several documents. “Usama ((Bin Ladin))’s Islamic Army considered the Pakistan/Afghanistan area one region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as a regional base and training center for Islamic Army activities supporting Islamic insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. [Excised] The Islamic Army had a camp in Pakistan [Excised] purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan.” [1997-07-14] While, “UBL elements in Pakistan reportedly plan to attack POTUS [U.S. President Clinton’s] plane with [excised] missiles if he visits Pakistan.” [2000-02-18] Similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, the document collection details repeated CIA warnings of the bin Laden terrorist threat prior to September 11. According to a January 2000 Top Secret briefing to the Director of Central Intelligence, disruption operations against the Millennium plot “bought time… weeks… months… but no more than one year” before al-Qaeda would strike. [2000-01-07] “A UBL attack against U.S. interests could occur at any time or any place. It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place.” [1999-08-03] By September 2001, CIA counterterrorism officials knew a plot was developing but couldn’t provide policymakers with details. “As of Late August 2001, there were indications that an individual associated with al-Qa’ida was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States, [Excised]. No further information is currently available in the timing of possible attacks or on the alleged targets in the United States.” [2001-08-24] Despite mounting warnings about al-Qaeda, the documents released today illustrate how prior to September 11, CIA counterterrorism units were lacking the funds to aggressively pursue bin Laden. “Budget concerns… CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level. Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections. Due to budgetary constraints… CTC/UBL [Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit] will move from offensive to defensive posture.” [2000-04-05] Although the collection is part of a laudable effort by the CIA to provide documents on events related to September 11, many of these materials are heavily redacted, and still only represent one-quarter of the CIA materials cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Hundreds of cited reports and cables remain classified, including all interrogation materials such as the 47 reports from CIA interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from March 24, 2003 – June 15, 2004, which are referenced in detail in the 9/11 Report. Highlights of the CIA September 11 Document Collection Include: The 1998 Raw Intelligence Report on UBL’s Plans to Hijack an Airplane that Became an Item in the December 4, 1998 President’s Daily Brief [1998-12-03]. The report details how bin Laden was planning “new operations against the United States (U.S.) targets in the near future. Plans to hijack a U.S. aircraft were proceeding well. Two individuals from the relevant operational team in the U.S. had successfully evaded security checks during a trial run at “New York airport [excised].” Internal CIA E-mails on Osama bin Laden 1998-05-05 – “[Title Excised]” “Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well,” To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Capture Op,” “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.” [Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report] 1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike” [Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119 9/11 Commission Report] 1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen,” [Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report] 1999-05-17 – “your note,” From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen” [Chapter 4, Endnote 174 9/11 Commission Report] 2001-05-15 – “[Excised] Query [Excised].” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 72 9/11 Commission Report] 2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “Agee (sic) we need to compare notes,” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report] 2001-07-13 – “[Excised] Khalad [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Richard to Alan” [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report] 2001-08-21 – “Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar,” Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mary to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report] Two Definitive CIA Reports on the September 11, 2001 Attacks 2003-06-01 – “11 September: The Plot and the Plotters,” CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. [Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105 9/11 Commission Report] This document is a comprehensive CIA history of the 9/11 attack. Analysis includes notes on al-Qaeda, the evolution of the plot, terrorist techniques, timelines and detailed hijacker profiles. 2004-03-19 – “DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. [Chapter 2, Endnote 67] This document is a detailed summary of CIA efforts to apprehend Osama bin Laden from 1989-2004. Highlights include: Agency notes on bin Laden’s evolution from “terrorist financier” in the early 1990s to a significant threat to U.S. interests by mid-1990. Discussions and debates regarding the use of Predator drones as early as 2000. [2] Critiques of FBI information systems as impediments to counterterrorism efforts – “A major, ongoing concern is FBI’s own internal dissemination system. CIA officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to the intended recipient within the FBI. In additional FBI has not perfected its FI reporting system and headquarters-field communications so dissemination of intelligence outside of FBI is still spotty.” And the report confirms suggestions by the 9/11 Commission Report that “the different organizational culture and goals of the FBI and CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results.” (p. 22) A group of Afghan trial leaders worked with the CIA on the UBL issue, but “[Excised] judged to be unlikely to successfully attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin.” “Masood has to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent of surrogate of the US government… Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent.” (p. 58)Note “DIF” written on multiple pages stands for “Denied in Full” A Series of CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs (SEIBS) from June-September 2001 Warning of “Imminent” Al-Qaeda Attacks: 2001-06-23 – “International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised]” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p. 257 9/11 Commission Report] 2001-06-25 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 14] 2001-06-30 – “Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 12] 2001-07-02 – “Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 18] 2001-07-13 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28] 2001-07-25 – “Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28] 2001-08-07 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342] Detailed Reports on Al-Qaeda Organization “The spike in the network’s activity stems in part from changes in Bin Ladin’s practices. To avoid implicating himself and his Taliban hosts, Bin Ladin over the past two years has allowed cells in his network, al-Qa’ida, to plan attacks more independently of the central leadership and has tried to gain support for his agenda outside the group. – The network also has benefited from a sharp increase in mujahidin recruitment since the resumption of the conflict in Chechnya in 1999, which exposed a new generation of militants to terrorist techniques and extremist ideology through training at al-Qai’da-run camps in Afghanistan. – Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests.” 2001-02-06 – “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency. [Chapter 8, Endnote 4 9/11 Commission Report] Bin Laden’s Attempts to Acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction “Bin Ladin and his associates have experimented by crude means to make and deploy biological agents… Bin Ladin has sought to acquire military-grade biological agents or weapons.” 2001-02-14 –”Afghanistan: Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytical Report [Chapter 11, Endnote 5. 9/11 Commission Report Page 342] A Positive CIA Assessment of CIA Counterterrorism Capabilities in August 2001 In contrast to the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report and a 2004 CIA Office of Inspector General’s review of its pre-9/11 counterterrorism practices, a report completed in August 2001 by the CIA Inspector General gives very positively reviews to CIA counterterrorism practices, the management of information and interagency cooperation. “CTC fulfills inter-agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues. The Center has made progress on problems identified at the time of the last inspection in 1994 – specifically its professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. CIA 9/11 DOCUMENT LIST 1992-05-29 – DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote23] 1992-07-17 – “Warning,” Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board from the Director of Central Intelligence.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 23] 1993-07-22 – “Funding of the Gama’at al-Islamiya by Wealthy Saudi Oppositionist Usama Bin Ladin; Composition of Sudanese Wing of the Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiya,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 1] 1994-10 – Office of Inspector General Inspection Report: The Agency’s Counterterrorism Effort. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnote 82] 1995-12 – “Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network,” DI TR 95-12, CIA Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 67] 1996-11-26 – “Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army, And Bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan.” [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnotes 25, 31, 35, 36, Chapter 4, Endnote 3] 1996-12-17 – “[Excised] Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan,” Memorandum, For: Acting Director for Central Intelligence, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 7] 1996-12-18 – [Title Excised] “The Following Was the Structure of Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 3] 1996-12-19 – “Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council Members.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 37] 1996-12-19 – “Terrorism: Activities and Functions of the Islamic Army’s Military Committee, and Political and Sharia Committee; Process of Approving Terrorist Operations,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 3] 1997-01-06 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability,” Counterterrorist Center Commentary, CTC 97-30002, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 49] 1997-01-08 – “Terrorism: Fatwa Issued in 1992 by Usama bin Ladin’s Islamic Army to Attack U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia, Movement of Explosives [Excised] by the Islamic Army [Excised] to Saudi Arabia [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 47] 1997-01-09 – [Title Excised] “A Fatwa Issued by Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Which Allowed for Attacks Against the U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 47] 1997-01-27 – [Title Excised] “Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Issued a Series of Fatwas, Most of the Against the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 3] 1997-01-31 – “Terrorism: Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army, Iran and the NIF,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 85] 1997-01-31 – “Terrorism: Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 52] 1997-02-13 – “Terrorism: Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an ‘Egyptian Operation’ and Logistical and Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 56] 1997-03-05 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Links to a Southern Yemeni Group,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 44] 1997-03-18 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Attempts to Acquire Uranium,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 49. Chapter 4, Endnote 3] 1997-04-18 – “Terrorism: Usama bin Ladin’s Historical Links to ‘Abdullah Azzam,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 22, 43] 1997-04-30 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 45, Chapter 4, Endnote 3,] 1997-06-17 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Financial Support to the Egyptian Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiyya, as well as Algerian and Libyan Extremists,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 1] 1997-07-14 – “Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin’s in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 67] 1997-08-01 – [Title Excised], “Plan to establish an Iraqi Element in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 54] 1997-08-25 – “DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 8] 1998-02-23 – “Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Al Quds al Arabi, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Open Source Center.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 1] 1998-05-05 – “[Title Excised]” “Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well,” To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Capture Op,” “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report] 1998-06 – “TERRORISM: Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief [Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1998 p. 342]. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5] 1998-08-14 – Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam-An Update,” Central Intelligence Agency Briefing Materials.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 37] 1998-09-02 – “Talking Points Regarding Usama Bin Ladin for the DCI’s 2 September 1998 SSCI Briefing,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 102] 1998-09-22 – [Title Excised]. “Terrorism: Incorporation of Ayman Zawahiri’s al-Jihad Organization into Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida; Recent Activities of Egyptian Associates of al-Qa’ida,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 82] 1998-11-18 – “Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Summary Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 121] 1998-11-19 – DCI Directive, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1: The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 13, Endnote 8] 1998-11-24 – “[Excised] Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem,” Talking Points, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 121] 1998-12-03 – [Title Excised] Planning by Usama Bin Ladin to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 112] 1998-12-04 – “Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 112] 1998-12-18 – [Title Excised] “Possible Arrest of Two Persons Involved in Plan to Hijack U.S. Airplane in the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113] 1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119] 1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report] 1998-12-24 – “[Excised] Timeframe for Completion of Hijacking Operation [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113] 1999-01 – “Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as January 1999 p. 342) . [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5] 1999-01-08 – “[Title Excised], Claim that Bin Ladin Postponed Hijacking,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113] 1999-01-27 – “How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,” 99-40003, DCI Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnote 118, Chapter 6, Endnote 86] 1999-02-10 – “[Excised] Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 157] 1999-03-16 – “[Title Excised], Iraqi Delegation [Excised] Meet with Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 75] 1999-04-05 – “[Excised] Terrorism: Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnote 85] 1999-04-09 – “Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively,” Counterterrorist Center, Intelligence Report, CTC 99-40007, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 86] 1999-05-17 – “your note,” From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 174] 1999-06 – “Caucasus: Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1999 p. 342). [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5] 1999-06-09 – “NEAR EAST: UAE: Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin’s Finances,” National Intelligence Daily, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 77] 1999-07-20 – “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 188] 1999-07-29 – “Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities,” OTI IR 1999-170CX, Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 77] 1999-08-03 – “UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 188] 1999-10-29 – “DDCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 193] 1999-11-12 – “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 193] 1999-12-11 – “Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5] 1999-12-17 – “Millennium Threat,” Briefing for DCI, December 16, 1999.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 3] 2000-01-07 – “Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 55] 2000-02-18 – “DCI Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorism Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnotes 63, 101] 2000-03-06 – “EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101] 2000-03-27 – “Afghanistan: Bin Ladin Evading Sanctions,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5] 2000-04-03 – “Islamic Extremist Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101] 2000-04-05 – “”EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101] 2000-05-22 – “DDO Update, Islamic Extremist Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101] 2000-06-30 –”Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks,” Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory, The Director of Central Intelligence.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 23] 2000-07-07 – “DDCI Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 103] 2000-07-14 – “DCI Updates – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 114] 2000-10-18 – “The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen,” Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment,” The Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 130] 2000-11-02 – “Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable,” CTC 00-400117, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnotes 4, 6] 2000-11-10 – “Attack on the USS Cole: Preliminary Findings,” DCI Counterterrorist Center,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 140] 2001-02-06 – “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 4] 2001-02-14 –”Afghanistan: Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342] 2001-03-23 – “Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin for Now,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342] 2001-03-27 – “Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism,” CTC 01-40004, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 78] 2001-04-12 – “Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target,” CTC 01-40003HCS, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnote 126] 2001-05-03 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 9] 2001-05-15 – “[Excised] Query [Excised].” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 72] 2001-05-23 – “Terrorism: Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 10] 2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “Agee (sic) we need to compare notes,” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 64] 2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “A Group Presently in the United States Planning to Conduct a Terrorist Operation Involving the Use of High Explosives,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 9] 2001-06-12 – “Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin Ladin Associates in Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 111] 2001-06-23 – “International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p.257] 2001-06-24 – “MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 16] 2001-06-25 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 12, 14] 2001-06-30 – “Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 12] 2001-07-02 – “Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 18] 2001-07-03 – “DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review,” Central Intelligence Agency. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 23] 2001-07-06 – “Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 20] 2001-07-13 – “[Excised] Khalad [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Richard to Alan.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 64] 2001-07-13 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 28] 2001-07-25 – “Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 28] 2001-08 – ” Office of Inspector General, Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations, IG 2000-0009-IN, Central Intelligence Agency..  [ Not cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Provided to Jeffery Richelson via the Freedom of Information Act ] 2001-08-06 – “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” President’s Daily Brief, Central Intelligence Agency. [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Reprinted on Page 261 of the 9/11 Commission Report.] 2001-08-07 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342] 2001-08-21 – “Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar,” Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mary to John.” [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report] 2001-08-23 – “DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 103] 2001-08-24 – “Terrorism: Sanitized Version of Threat Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 39] 2001-09 – Michael Warner, “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution,” Center for the Study of Intelligence.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnote 70] 2001-11-29 – “Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 80] 2001-12-08 – “Terrorism: Discovery that 11 September 2001 Hijacker Mohammed Atta Did Not Travel to the Czech Republic on 31 May 2000,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 69] 2002-02-27 – “Identifying Al-Qa’ida’s Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnotes 116, 117, Chapter 7, Endnote 70] 2002-08-07 – “Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa’ida Functioning,” PWR080702-05, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnotes 111, 127] 2002-10-17 – “Written Statement for the Record of the DCI,” Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 103, Chapter 6, Endnote 54, Chapter 8, Endnote 60] 2002-11-14 – “Saudi Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations,” CTC 2002-40117CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 77] 2002-12-06 – “Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa’ida Travel,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 12, Endnote 32] 2003-03-10 – “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths,” CTC 200340028CHX, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 30] 2003-03-18 – “CT: Presence of Al-Qa’ida Operative Tawfiq Muhammad Bin Salah Bin Rushayd Bin Attash in Los Angeles In Summer 2000; Association of Bin Attash With U.S.-Based Extremists,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 9] 2003-06-01 – “11 September: The Plot and the Plotters,” CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105] 2003-06-20 – “Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa’ida Train on the Run?” CTC 2003-40071CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 89, 93, 102] 2003-07-02 – “[Title Excised] Shaykh Sa’id [Excised] devotes him time to managing al-Qa’ida’s finances,” CTC 2003-30072H, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Shaykh Sa’id: Al-Qa’ida’s Loyal Senior Accountant.”  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 59] 2003-12-10 – “Requested Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'” Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency Director of Congressional affairs Stanley M. Moskowitz to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 76] [Undated – Likely 2004] – “DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1, Production of the [Excised] Usama Bin Ladin Situation Reports (‘UBL Sitreps’),” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 1] [Undated – Likely 2004] – “DCI Document Request No. 52, Item No. 2,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [Likely 9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 2] 2004-02-24 – “DCI Testimony: The Worldwide Threat 2004,” Testimony of George Tenet, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 12, Endnote 28] 2004-03-11 – “Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates as of 11 March 2004,” Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 49] 2004-03-19 – “DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 67] 2004-03-24 – “Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United State,” Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnotes 85, 108, Chapter 13, Endnote 15] 2004-04-14 – “Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community,” Panel One of the Tenth Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.  [9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 38] NOTES [1] See also 9/11 Commission Report p 190. [2] See also 9/11 Commission Report, p. 189.

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