New NSA Docs Contradict 9-11 Claims

Let’s start there. In 2000 and 2001, the CIA began using Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Afghanistan. “The idea of using UAVs originated in April 2000 as a result of a request from the NSC’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the CIA and the Department of Defense to come up with new ideas to go after the terrorists in Afghanistan,” a 2004 document https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/368992/2004-03-19-dci-report-the-rise-of-ubl-and-al.pdf
And yet, simultaneously, the CIA declared that budget concerns were forcing it to move its Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit from an “offensive” to a “defensive” posture. For the CIA, that meant trying to get Afghan tribal leaders and the Northern Alliance to kill or capture bin Laden, Elias-Sanborn says. “It was forced to be less of a kinetic operation,” she says. “It had to be only for surveillance, which was not what they considered an offensive posture.”
“Budget concerns … CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level,” an April 2000 document reads. “Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections.” In addition, the Air Force told the CIA that if it lost a drone, the CIA would have to pay for it, which made the agency more reluctant to use the technology.
Still, the drone program began in September 2000. One drone swiftly twice observed an individual “most likely to have been Bin Laden.” But since the CIA only had permission to use the drones for intelligence gathering, it had no way to act on its findings. The agency submitted a proposal to the National Security Council staff in December 2000 that would have significantly expanded the program. “It was too late for the departing Clinton Administration to take action on this strategic request,” however. It wasn’t too late for the Bush administration, though. It just never did.
Former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has taken credit for the drone program that the Bush administration ignored. “Things like working to get an armed Predator that actually turned out to be extraordinarily important, working to get a strategy that would allow us to get better cooperation from Pakistan and from the Central Asians,” she said in 2006. “We were not left a comprehensive strategy to fight al-Qaida.” Rice claimed that the Bush administration continued the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism policies, a claim the documents disprove. “If the administration wanted to get it done, I’m sure they could have gotten it done,” says Elias-Sanborn.
Many of the documents publicize for the first time what was first made clear in the 9/11 Commission: The White House received a truly remarkable amount of warnings that al-Qaida was trying to attack the United States. From June to September 2001, a full seven CIA Senior Intelligence Briefs detailed that attacks were imminent, an incredible amount of information from one intelligence agency. One from June called “Bin-Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats” writes that “[redacted] expects Usama Bin Laden to launch multiple attacks over the coming days.” The famous August brief called “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike the US” is included. “Al-Qai’da members, including some US citizens, have resided in or travelled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure here,” it says. During the entire month of August, President Bush was on vacation at his ranch in Texas — which tied with one of Richard Nixon’s as the longest vacation ever taken by a president. CIA Director George Tenet has said he didn’t speak to Bush once that month, describing the president as being “on leave.” Bush did not hold a Principals’ meeting on terrorism until September 4, 2001, havingdowngraded the meetings to a deputies’ meeting, which then-counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke has repeatedly said slowed down anti-Bin Laden efforts “enormously, by months.”
For all the information the documents reveal, one huge matter is conspicuously absent: torture. There are nearly 50 CIA documents relating to such matters as the interrogation of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the intelligence gleaned from him, and yet “none of them were declassified at all,” notes Elias-Sanborn. “Certainly, the CIA has a stake in revealing what they did,” and they clearly do not want to reveal their complicity in war crimes.
One last thing is worth mentioning from the documents published today: Anyone with any doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dangerous to the United States is contradicting U.S. intelligence. “Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests,” the CIA wrote in February 2001. It is not the only piece of information revealed by the new documents that will be deeply uncomfortable for the Bush administration and hawks across the country.
Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.
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The Central Intelligence Agency’s 9/11 FileTop Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden DeclassifiedNational Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 381Posted – June 19, 2012 Edited by Barbara Elias-Sanborn with Thanks to Archive Senior Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson For more information contact: Washington, D.C., June 19, 2012 – The National Security Archive today is posting over 100 recently released CIA documents relating to September 11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations. The newly-declassified records, which the Archive obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, are referred to in footnotes to the 9/11 Commission Report and present an unprecedented public resource for information about September 11. The collection includes rarely released CIA emails, raw intelligence cables, analytical summaries, high-level briefing materials, and comprehensive counterterrorism reports that are usually withheld from the public because of their sensitivity. Today’s posting covers a variety of topics of major public interest, including background to al-Qaeda’s planning for the attacks; the origins of the Predator program now in heavy use over Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; al-Qaeda’s relationship with Pakistan; CIA attempts to warn about the impending threat; and the impact of budget constraints on the U.S. government’s hunt for bin Laden. Today’s posting is the result of a series of FOIA requests by National Security Archive staff based on a painstaking review of references in the 9/11 Commission Report. DOCUMENT HIGHLIGHTSThe documents released by CIA detail the meticulousness of al-Qaeda’s plot against the United States and CIA attempts to counter the rising terrorist threat. A previously undisclosed raw intelligence report that became the basis for the December 4, 1998, President’s Daily Brief notes that five years before the actual attack, al-Qaeda operatives had successfully evaded security at a New York airport in a test-run for bin Laden’s plan to hijack a U.S. airplane. [1998-12-03]. CIA analytical reports also provide interesting insights into al-Qaeda’s evolving political strategies. “In our view, the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value. For instance, the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family.” [2003-06-01] Reports on early attempts to apprehend bin Laden detail the beginning of the U.S. Predator drone program in Afghanistan and Pakistan. “First Predator mission over Afghanistan [excised] September 7, 2000.” [1] “Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however we had no way at the time to react to this information.” [2004-03-19] American UAVs did not have sufficient weapons capabilities at the time the CIA likely spotted bin Laden in 2000 to fire on the suspect using the UAV. Al-Qaeda’s ties to Pakistan before September 11 are also noted in several documents. “Usama ((Bin Ladin))’s Islamic Army considered the Pakistan/Afghanistan area one region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as a regional base and training center for Islamic Army activities supporting Islamic insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. [Excised] The Islamic Army had a camp in Pakistan [Excised] purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan.” [1997-07-14] While, “UBL elements in Pakistan reportedly plan to attack POTUS [U.S. President Clinton’s] plane with [excised] missiles if he visits Pakistan.” [2000-02-18] Similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, the document collection details repeated CIA warnings of the bin Laden terrorist threat prior to September 11. According to a January 2000 Top Secret briefing to the Director of Central Intelligence, disruption operations against the Millennium plot “bought time… weeks… months… but no more than one year” before al-Qaeda would strike. [2000-01-07] “A UBL attack against U.S. interests could occur at any time or any place. It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place.” [1999-08-03] By September 2001, CIA counterterrorism officials knew a plot was developing but couldn’t provide policymakers with details. “As of Late August 2001, there were indications that an individual associated with al-Qa’ida was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States, [Excised]. No further information is currently available in the timing of possible attacks or on the alleged targets in the United States.” [2001-08-24] Despite mounting warnings about al-Qaeda, the documents released today illustrate how prior to September 11, CIA counterterrorism units were lacking the funds to aggressively pursue bin Laden. “Budget concerns… CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level. Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections. Due to budgetary constraints… CTC/UBL [Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit] will move from offensive to defensive posture.” [2000-04-05] Although the collection is part of a laudable effort by the CIA to provide documents on events related to September 11, many of these materials are heavily redacted, and still only represent one-quarter of the CIA materials cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Hundreds of cited reports and cables remain classified, including all interrogation materials such as the 47 reports from CIA interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from March 24, 2003 – June 15, 2004, which are referenced in detail in the 9/11 Report. Highlights of the CIA September 11 Document Collection Include:
CIA 9/11 DOCUMENT LIST1992-05-29 – DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning. 1992-07-17 – “Warning,” Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board from the Director of Central Intelligence. 1993-07-22 – “Funding of the Gama’at al-Islamiya by Wealthy Saudi Oppositionist Usama Bin Ladin; Composition of Sudanese Wing of the Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiya,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1994-10 – Office of Inspector General Inspection Report: The Agency’s Counterterrorism Effort. 1995-12 – “Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network,” DI TR 95-12, CIA Analytic Report. 1996-11-26 – “Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army, And Bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan.” 1996-12-17 – “[Excised] Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan,” Memorandum, For: Acting Director for Central Intelligence, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency. 1996-12-18 – [Title Excised] “The Following Was the Structure of Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1996-12-19 – “Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council Members.” 1996-12-19 – “Terrorism: Activities and Functions of the Islamic Army’s Military Committee, and Political and Sharia Committee; Process of Approving Terrorist Operations,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-01-06 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability,” Counterterrorist Center Commentary, CTC 97-30002, Central Intelligence Agency. 1997-01-08 – “Terrorism: Fatwa Issued in 1992 by Usama bin Ladin’s Islamic Army to Attack U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia, Movement of Explosives [Excised] by the Islamic Army [Excised] to Saudi Arabia [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-01-09 – [Title Excised] “A Fatwa Issued by Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Which Allowed for Attacks Against the U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-01-27 – [Title Excised] “Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Issued a Series of Fatwas, Most of the Against the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-01-31 – “Terrorism: Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army, Iran and the NIF,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-01-31 – “Terrorism: Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-02-13 – “Terrorism: Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an ‘Egyptian Operation’ and Logistical and Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-03-05 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Links to a Southern Yemeni Group,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-03-18 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Attempts to Acquire Uranium,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-04-18 – “Terrorism: Usama bin Ladin’s Historical Links to ‘Abdullah Azzam,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-04-30 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-06-17 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Financial Support to the Egyptian Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiyya, as well as Algerian and Libyan Extremists,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-07-14 – “Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin’s in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-08-01 – [Title Excised], “Plan to establish an Iraqi Element in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1997-08-25 – “DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency. 1998-02-23 – “Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Al Quds al Arabi, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Open Source Center. 1998-05-05 – “[Title Excised]” “Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well,” To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Capture Op,” “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.” 1998-06 – “TERRORISM: Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief [Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1998 p. 342]. 1998-08-14 – Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam-An Update,” Central Intelligence Agency Briefing Materials. 1998-09-02 – “Talking Points Regarding Usama Bin Ladin for the DCI’s 2 September 1998 SSCI Briefing,” Central Intelligence Agency. 1998-09-22 – [Title Excised]. “Terrorism: Incorporation of Ayman Zawahiri’s al-Jihad Organization into Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida; Recent Activities of Egyptian Associates of al-Qa’ida,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1998-11-18 – “Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Summary Report. 1998-11-19 – DCI Directive, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1: The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community.” 1998-11-24 – “[Excised] Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem,” Talking Points, Central Intelligence Agency. 1998-12-03 – [Title Excised] Planning by Usama Bin Ladin to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport. 1998-12-04 – “Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1998-12-18 – [Title Excised] “Possible Arrest of Two Persons Involved in Plan to Hijack U.S. Airplane in the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.” 1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.” 1998-12-24 – “[Excised] Timeframe for Completion of Hijacking Operation [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1999-01 – “Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as January 1999 p. 342) . 1999-01-08 – “[Title Excised], Claim that Bin Ladin Postponed Hijacking,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1999-01-27 – “How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,” 99-40003, DCI Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1999-02-10 – “[Excised] Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-03-16 – “[Title Excised], Iraqi Delegation [Excised] Meet with Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1999-04-05 – “[Excised] Terrorism: Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1999-04-09 – “Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively,” Counterterrorist Center, Intelligence Report, CTC 99-40007, Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-05-17 – “your note,” From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.” 1999-06 – “Caucasus: Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1999 p. 342). 1999-06-09 – “NEAR EAST: UAE: Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin’s Finances,” National Intelligence Daily, Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-07-20 – “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-07-29 – “Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities,” OTI IR 1999-170CX, Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 1999-08-03 – “UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-10-29 – “DDCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-11-12 – “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-12-11 – “Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency. 1999-12-17 – “Millennium Threat,” Briefing for DCI, December 16, 1999. 2000-01-07 – “Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-02-18 – “DCI Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorism Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-03-06 – “EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-03-27 – “Afghanistan: Bin Ladin Evading Sanctions,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-04-03 – “Islamic Extremist Update,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-04-05 – “”EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-05-22 – “DDO Update, Islamic Extremist Update,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-06-30 –”Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks,” Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory, The Director of Central Intelligence. 2000-07-07 – “DDCI Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-07-14 – “DCI Updates – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-10-18 – “The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen,” Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment,” The Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. 2000-11-02 – “Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable,” CTC 00-400117, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2000-11-10 – “Attack on the USS Cole: Preliminary Findings,” DCI Counterterrorist Center,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2001-02-06 – “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency. 2001-02-14 –”Afghanistan: Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2001-03-23 – “Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin for Now,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency. 2001-03-27 – “Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism,” CTC 01-40004, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2001-04-12 – “Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target,” CTC 01-40003HCS, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2001-05-03 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-05-15 – “[Excised] Query [Excised].” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” 2001-05-23 – “Terrorism: Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “Agee (sic) we need to compare notes,” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” 2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “A Group Presently in the United States Planning to Conduct a Terrorist Operation Involving the Use of High Explosives,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2001-06-12 – “Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin Ladin Associates in Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2001-06-23 – “International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-06-24 – “MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 2001-06-25 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-06-30 – “Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-07-02 – “Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-07-03 – “DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2001-07-06 – “Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2001-07-13 – “[Excised] Khalad [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Richard to Alan.” 2001-07-13 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-07-25 – “Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-08 – ” Office of Inspector General, Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations, IG 2000-0009-IN, Central Intelligence Agency.. 2001-08-06 – “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” President’s Daily Brief, Central Intelligence Agency. 2001-08-07 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 2001-08-21 – “Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar,” Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mary to John.” 2001-08-23 – “DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2001-08-24 – “Terrorism: Sanitized Version of Threat Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2001-09 – Michael Warner, “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution,” Center for the Study of Intelligence. 2001-11-29 – “Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2001-12-08 – “Terrorism: Discovery that 11 September 2001 Hijacker Mohammed Atta Did Not Travel to the Czech Republic on 31 May 2000,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2002-02-27 – “Identifying Al-Qa’ida’s Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2002-08-07 – “Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa’ida Functioning,” PWR080702-05, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2002-10-17 – “Written Statement for the Record of the DCI,” Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Central Intelligence Agency. 2002-11-14 – “Saudi Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations,” CTC 2002-40117CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2002-12-06 – “Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa’ida Travel,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2003-03-10 – “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths,” CTC 200340028CHX, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2003-03-18 – “CT: Presence of Al-Qa’ida Operative Tawfiq Muhammad Bin Salah Bin Rushayd Bin Attash in Los Angeles In Summer 2000; Association of Bin Attash With U.S.-Based Extremists,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2003-06-01 – “11 September: The Plot and the Plotters,” CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. 2003-06-20 – “Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa’ida Train on the Run?” CTC 2003-40071CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2003-07-02 – “[Title Excised] Shaykh Sa’id [Excised] devotes him time to managing al-Qa’ida’s finances,” CTC 2003-30072H, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Shaykh Sa’id: Al-Qa’ida’s Loyal Senior Accountant.” 2003-12-10 – “Requested Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'” Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency Director of Congressional affairs Stanley M. Moskowitz to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. [Undated – Likely 2004] – “DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1, Production of the [Excised] Usama Bin Ladin Situation Reports (‘UBL Sitreps’),” Central Intelligence Agency. [Undated – Likely 2004] – “DCI Document Request No. 52, Item No. 2,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2004-02-24 – “DCI Testimony: The Worldwide Threat 2004,” Testimony of George Tenet, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 2004-03-11 – “Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates as of 11 March 2004,” Central Intelligence Agency. 2004-03-19 – “DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. 2004-03-24 – “Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United State,” Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency. 2004-04-14 – “Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community,” Panel One of the Tenth Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. NOTES |